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The automotive industry was one of the earliest to internationalise, with overseas production by US 
companies already happening in the early 1900s. However, the arrangement for overseas automotive 
production at that time was quite different from the idea of international production networks in the 
contemporary sense. There were few linkages between international locations and overseas operations were 
designed either as largely self-sufficient, vertically integrated, replications of their domestic factories or as 
CKD/SKD assembly plants with little local technical content. By comparison, our current understanding of 
international production networks is that they are dispersed, collaborative, high value adding and centrally 
coordinated. This paper uses global company case analysis to identify the drivers and enablers that shape 
the international production networks of two automotive companies, BMW and Volvo Cars. The methodology 
contrasts with previous network studies of the automotive industry that have concentrated their analysis at 
the country and regional level.       
 
Keywords: international production networks; automotive industry; case studies; drivers; enablers 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND AIM OF PAPER 
 
The idea of establishing an international production 
network for automotive companies, in the sense that we 
understand today, is relatively very different from the 
concept of overseas production in the early 1900s when 
US manufacturers started to internationalise, or even the 
1950s when European companies first established 
overseas plants. The US and European companies that 
were early movers did not have many linkages between 
their international locations and they designed their 
overseas operations either as largely self-sufficient, 
vertically integrated, replications of their domestic 
factories or as CKD/SKD assembly plants with little local 
technical content. By comparison, our current 
understanding of international production networks is that 
they have the characteristics of being “dispersed”, 
“collaborative”, “high value adding” and “centrally 
coordinated” rather than the more traditional “pipeline of 
physical transformation” [1]. The aim of this paper is to 
undertake an empirical exploration of the recent 
developments in international production networks within 
the automotive industry. Its focus is on larger (but not 
necessarily the largest) automotive companies. In 
particular, the paper investigates the most significant 
drivers and enablers that shape the way international 
production networks today have been designed, or have 
evolved. As evidence, it uses data from case studies of 
automotive companies in which the drivers and enablers 
for their international network design have been identified. 
One is BMW, which for its 3 brands has a network of 23 
wholly owned and joint venture plants for parts production 
and car assembly, 5 “partner” plants for local assembly 
and 2 contract plants that provide additional capacity for 
producing more specialised vehicles.  The other is Volvo 
Car Corporation, which for its single brand has an 
expanding international network including plants jointly 
operated with its Chinese owner Zhejiang Geely. Currently 
this owned network comprises 8 plants for parts 
production and car assembly, together with 3 centres for 
design, R&D and engineering.  The paper addresses a 
research gap by considering the more contemporary 
approaches to international network design for production 
compared with earlier studies that have focused on more 
conceptual benefits of networks [2] and strategies 
underlying their configuration [3].  
 
2. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION IN THE 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
The automotive industry started to internationalise only a 
few years after the birth of the industry during the early 
1900s. In 1910 General Motors established a joint venture 
in the UK and by 1930 had added car assembly plants in 
Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, India and Spain. By 1929, 
Ford was assembling cars in the UK, Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico, Sweden, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Italy, Germany and Japan. Beyond the US, 
internationalisation of automotive companies was much 
slower. In the early 1900s the industry in Europe 
comprised a large number of smaller companies, so there 
was little motivation and insufficient resources for 
establishing foreign plants. Instead a number of European 
companies licensed production to newcomers elsewhere 
in the world. Large scale international production of 
European cars overseas did not start until after the 
Second World War, with Volkswagen establishing its plant 
in Brazil in 1953. In 1958 the British Austin Motor 
Company opened a plant in Australia and also during the 
1950s the Standard Motor Company opened overseas 
plants in Australia, India, South Africa and France. By the 
1960s and 1970s, internationalisation was becoming 
increasingly prevalent in the automotive industry as most 
of the main manufacturers started to open overseas 
plants. At the same time, new countries emerged as 
locations for automotive production and started to develop 
their own automotive industries. South Korea, and later 
China, became major automotive manufacturing countries 
with government strategy promoting the establishment of 
indigenous car and commercial vehicle companies.  
 
3. DRIVERS AND ENABLERS IN OPERATIONS 
STRATEGY 
 
Traditional operations strategy comprises the competitive 
priorities of the company (how it intends to position itself 
in the market related to the product and services offered), 
as well as decision categories (the decisions and 
capabilities that the company has to manage in order to 
comply with the competitive priorities). The different 
competitive priorities vary, but according to Wu and Ellis 
[4] the commonly accepted ones are quality, cost, lead 
time, delivery reliability, flexibility (which could include 
design flexibility and volume flexibility). Hayes and 
Wheelwright [5] also listed the decision categories for a 
factory manufacturing system, i.e. 
• Capacity: amount, timing, type 
• Facilities: size, location, specialisation 
• Technology: equipment, automation, linkage 
• Vertical integration: direction, extent, balance 
• Workforce: skill level, wage policies, employment 
security 
• Quality: defect prevention, monitoring, intervention 
• Production planning/material control: sourcing 
policies, centralisation, decision rules 
• Organisation structure: structure, control/reward 
system, role of staff groups 
This list of priorities and decisions becomes even more 
complex when entering manufacturing networks acting 
globally. 
 
4.  EXTENDED OPERATIONS STRATEGY IN 
INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS 
 
When applied to international production the competitive 
priorities and decision categories for factory level 
operations are also appropriate, but for the purpose of 
taking strategic network design decisions they will usually 
devolve down to second level drivers and enablers that 
are more relevant to the specific context of the company 
and its various network players (subsidiaries, partners, 
suppliers of materials and technology etc.). For example, 
the cost priority will normally have a longer time horizon 
and take account of the need to meet the demands of 
different geographical markets. And the decision category 
of vertical integration will be modified to take account of 
the dispersed nature of the network elements together 
with the way in which this impacts the conventional ideas 
about economies of scale.  
 
In addition to the decision categories for factory 
manufacturing systems, Shi and Gregory [1] have 
identified other operations strategy aspects that are 
important to consider in international networks, i.e.  
• Geographic dispersion: distributed factory condition 
• Horizontal coordination: coordinated mechanism 
• Vertical coordination: international dispersion of the 
corporate value-adding chains and their linkages 
• Dynamic response mechanism: opportunity identify, 
and manufacturing mobility 
• Product life cycle and knowledge transfer in 
international manufacturing networks 
• Operational mechanism: network daily co-ordination, 
management information system 
• Dynamic capability building and network evolution: 
learning by operations 
 
Cheng et al [6] described the development of 
manufacturing networks and how the different plants 
within a manufacturing network are interrelated. What can 
be noted from their results is that the development of the 
plants is dependent on local knowledge, access to 
network knowledge, and how well top management 
succeeds in knowledge transfer/exchange to support 
development. 
 
Karlsson and Sköld [7] added more organisational 
aspects on industrial networks and especially when the 
geographical distance is longer, as in international 
networks. In their study, they found that factories within a 
company group often compete with each other. None of 
the factories can be certain to get the task to produce, 
meaning that they need to be the best producer of that 
specific product. The choice is made based on different 
aspects, such as available capacity and competence, 
geographical suitability and availability of local suppliers, 
historical performance, and naturally also on cost 
performance. However, the factory that already has the 
task to industrialise a new product does, through its 
existing knowledge and capabilities, have a considerable 
advantage in this competition. The most important 
aspects of manufacturing networks and their interrelations 
are described in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Manufacturing Network Context  




For this paper two medium-size automotive companies 
have been selected, BMW and Volvo Car Corporation. In 
2016 the three largest automotive companies 
(Volkswagen Group, Toyota and General Motors) each 
produced around 10 million cars. By comparison, in the 
same year BMW produced nearly 2.4 million cars and 
Volvo Car produced more than 530,000 (with its parent 
company, Geely, also producing more than 765,000 cars). 
Most of the data for the cases were collected from public 
sources including company reports, press statements and 
articles, published research, Internet sources etc. Both 
companies have also been the subject of related empirical 
research investigations by the authors over many years, 
so accumulated information from plant visits and 
interviews was used to supplement the data collected 
from desk research. Simple visual text analysis of the 
data was used to identify the main drivers and enablers 
that have shaped the configurations of each case 
company’s international manufacturing network.  
Of particular importance in the analysis was to construct a 
historical timeline that identified relevant acquisitions and 
disposals in order to ascertain the extent to which network 
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design has been the consequence of new influences 
within the whole company group or legacy factors from 
past decisions.  In using global company case analysis, 
the research approach contrasts with previous network 
studies of the automotive industry that have concentrated 
their analysis at the country and regional level [8], [9].     
 
6. THE CASE COMPANIES 
 
6.1 BMW company origins 
 
BMW (Bayerische Motoren Werke) started in 1917 as an 
aircraft engine manufacturer based in Munich, Germany, 
but under the Versailles Treaty it had to stop producing 
military related products, so in 1922 began making small 
motorcycle engines and then complete motorcycles. Car 
production started in 1928 when BMW acquired the 
Eisenach car company and its facilities. The first model 
was a license built version of the British Austin Seven. 
During the 1930s BMW established a reputation as a 
maker of prestigious sports cars, then from 1939 to 1945 
it built engines for the German air force and suspended 
car production. Between 1945 and 1951 some “BMW” 
branded cars were produced at the Eisenach plant, but 
this was in the Eastern Zone controlled by the Soviet 
Union so outside the jurisdiction of the West German 
authorities. Meanwhile the original BMW company 
produced motorcycles at its Munich plant until the dispute 
about its trade name was settled in 1952. By 1958 BMW 
was in financial difficulty and survived by making the Iso 
Isetta three-wheeled “bubble car”. Only after 1959 was the 
company transformed by its new owners to become the 
international brand we know today. This transformation 
started with the introduction of BMW’s New Class (Neue 
Klasse) cars during the 1960s.  
 
6.2 Establishment of BMW's international plant 
network 
 
In 1973 BMW's first overseas plant was established in 
South Africa to assemble complete cars for the local 
market from kits supplied from Germany. Then in 1979 it 
opened a dedicated engine plant in Steyr, Austria (250 km 
from Munich). By the mid-1990s BMW had 34 wholly-
owned subsidiaries. Of these 14 were in Germany and the 
other 20 were located around the world. It also had more 
than 130 foreign sales operations. BMW's manufacturing 
activities were concentrated in six plants in Germany. 
These included a motorcycle plant in Berlin and a tooling 
plant in Eisenach (after German re-unification the old 
Eisenach car plant closed). In addition, BMW operated a 
number of overseas assembly plants in partnership with 
local companies. In Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
local partners assembled BMW cars from kits under joint 
venture manufacturing agreements. In 1994, three new 
overseas assembly plants were established. One was in 
the Philippines and another in Vietnam to assemble cars 
from kits supplied from Germany, thereby avoiding the 
high tariffs from which were exempt by being augmented 
with locally purchased components to comply with local 
content regulations. The third plant to be established in 
1994 was in the USA. This comprehensive production 
facility at Spartanburg, South Carolina, has since proved 
to be one of the most important parts of BMW’s 
international network, being dedicated to the production of 
several models for worldwide markets. In 1994 BMW also 
acquired the Rover Group in the UK, which was sold 
again in 2000. However, three significant parts were kept, 
the new Mini model, under development since 1995, a 
new engine plant and a body shop. In 1998, twenty-five 
years after opening its first overseas plant, BMW acquired 
the UK Rolls-Royce brand (but not the manufacturing 
facility for producing Rolls-Royce cars, which was 
acquired by Volkswagen along with the Bentley brand). 
BMW therefore entirely redesigned the Rolls-Royce 
models using major parts supplied from other BMW 




6.3 Main features of BMW’s international plant 
network  
 
At the present time BMW has a network of 23 wholly 
owned and joint venture plants for car assembly and parts 
production, 5 “partner” plants for local assembly and 2 
contract plants that provide additional capacity for 
producing more specialised vehicles.  It also has 12 
design and R&D plants in 5 countries. The number of 
BMW employees worldwide is 124,000. There are 8 plants 
in Germany, with 4 of these assembling cars and 4 
focusing on parts and tooling production. Some of the 
assembly plants also produce parts including engines. 
One of the German plants that makes parts also 
assembles motorcycles. The plant in Austria is dedicated 
to making engines. Outside Germany there are car 
assembly plants in Brazil, India, the UK, the USA, 
Thailand (including motorcycle assembly), South Africa 
and Mexico (starting production in 2019). There are also 
joint venture plants assembling cars from kits in Russia, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Brazil (making 
motorcycles). In the UK, there are 2 assembly plants (Mini 
and Rolls Royce), a parts plant making body components 
and an engine plant. In China, automotive companies can 
only operate with a local partner so BMW has a joint 
venture with “Brilliance Automotive” and has 2 plants in 
Shenyang producing cars, various parts and engines. All 
cars made in China by BMW are for the Chinese market 
only but exports are being considered. Currently BMW 
and Brilliance do not share any production or parts 
supply. However, they have jointly developed electric cars 
with a separate Chinese brand. In Austria and the 
Netherlands two plants assemble special variants of the 
BMW Mini, but they are independently owned.  BMW’s 
wider international network includes 12,000 external 
suppliers in 70 countries. Of these, around 100 are first 
tier suppliers for major parts such as automatic 
transmissions, axles, steering columns, brakes etc. BMW 
has implemented the “supplier park” concept for its first-
tier suppliers with the first being opened at its Leipzig 
assembly plant in 2005.  
 
6.4 Volvo Car Corporation origins 
 
The Volvo trademark was first registered in 1915 by SKF, 
the Swedish machinery bearing company based in the city 
of Gothenburg, with the name deriving from the Latin verb 
“volvere”, meaning to roll. However, the company AB 
Volvo was not established until 1926 with the first car 
being produced in 1927 at a plant in Lundby, near to 
Gothenburg.  During the following 70 years Volvo grew to 
become a large international group making cars, buses, 
trucks, construction equipment, marine engines, aircraft 
engines and various ancillary products. Cars produced by 
Volvo gained a reputation for quality, reliability and 
durability, which enabled the company to build on key 
markets in Europe, North America and worldwide. By 
1974 Volvo had four car assembly plants in Sweden and 
several other plants producing automotive parts. In 1999 
Ford Motor Company bought AB Volvo’s car division, 
Volvo Car Corporation (Volvo Personvagnar) and it 
became part of Ford’s Premier Automotive Group together 
with the existing brand of Lincoln and its other European 
acquisitions of Jaguar, Land Rover and Aston Martin. 
During the next 10 years Ford tried to build its stable of 
distinctive prestige brands and also sought to gain 
economies of scale through the use of common designs, 
parts and group purchasing. However, Ford’s strategy 
failed and drained both cash and resources at the time of 
the economic downturn. In 2010 Volvo Car was therefore 
sold to the Chinese automotive company, Zhejiang Geely 
Holding Group. Under Geely, Volvo Car started a new 
phase of its development focusing on an expansion of 
sales and manufacturing in China and the Asian region as 
well as re-establishing its reputation and building on 
existing markets.  
   
6.5 Establishment of Volvo Car’s international plant 
network 
 
In 1963 Volvo Car Corporation opened its first overseas 
plant in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. The purpose was 
to circumvent North American import tariffs on foreign 
goods and to capitalize on the newly signed 
Canadian/American Auto Pact. Then in 1965, the Ghent 
plant in Belgium was opened Also during the 1960s the 
Malaysian government offered incentives to foreign 
automotive companies in the form of lower duties on 
vehicles that were assembled locally from ‘kits’ of parts 
sent from parent factories.  Therefore, a joint venture was 
formed in 1967 between Volvo and Federal Auto Holdings 
for assembly of cars at a new plant in Shah Alam near 
Kuala Lumpur.  In 1972 Volvo bought the Dutch company 
DAF and for several years produced cars at the plant in 
Born. The last Volvo was produced at Born in 2004, 
although by that time the plant had been sold to 
Mitsubishi Motors. In 1998 the Halifax plant was closed, 
just before the acquisition of Volvo Car by Ford. In 2006 
Ford started to produce Volvos in Chongqing, China, at its 
joint venture factory called Chang’an Ford Mazda 
Automotive. Since 2010, under the ownership of Geely, 
several new Volvo assembly plants have been established 
in China, although production under contract continued at 
the Ford joint venture plant in Chongqing until 2016. 
 
6.6 Main features of Volvo Car’s international plant 
network  
 
At the present time Volvo Car Corporation has 10 plants 
for car assembly and parts production, together with 4 
centres for design, R&D and engineering. The number of 
Volvo Car employees worldwide is 31,000. There are 3 
plants in Sweden with one of these assembling cars and 2 
focusing on parts production. The single Swedish 
assembly plant, at Torslanda near Gothenburg, has 
recently been expanded to increase capacity from 200,000 
to 300,000 cars per year. The last of the other car 
assembly plants in Sweden was closed in 2013 and 
another parts-producing plant was sold to an independent 
supplier in 2015 since only 30% of its output was for 
Volvo Car.  The plant in Belgium is the company’s second 
in Europe and has a capacity of 270,000 cars per year. A 
new plant in the USA (in Charleston, South Carolina) is 
due to start production in 2018 with initial capacity of 
100,000 cars per year. Design and R&D activity for 
Volvo’s cars is carried out in a number of centres 
including Gothenburg, California and Copenhagen in 
Denmark.  In China, Volvo Car has a joint venture with 
Geely (its owner). Since Geely’s acquisition of the Volvo 
two new car assembly plants have been built, at Chengdu 
in Sichuan Province and Daqing in Heilongjiang Province. 
Also, one other plant is under construction at Luqiao in 
Zhejiang Province. In addition, there is an engine plant at 
Zhangjiakou in Hebei Province and an engineering and 
R&D centre in Shanghai. All cars made in China by Volvo 
are for the Chinese market only but exports are proposed 
in the future. Volvo plans to make around 800,000 cars 
per year globally by 2020, with one third produced in 
China. Currently, Volvo Car and Geely do not share any 
production or parts supply. However, they have a 
technical collaboration for electric vehicles and it is also 
proposed to make a new small SUV both in Belgium and 
at the plant in Luqiao. Using common architecture there 
will be a Volvo model of this car and a Geely version sold 
under a new brand name. The wider international network 
of Volvo Car Corporation includes more than 4,000 
external suppliers. Of these, 600 are described as 
“business partners delivering production materials for 
serial production”. In 1995 Volvo Car opened a supplier 
park for its plant in Belgium and in 1998 a supplier park 
was opened in Gothenburg after halving the number of the 
plant’s first tier suppliers to 150, of which fifteen located 
into a new supplier park producing modules for 
headliners, seats, tailgates, bumpers etc.  
 
7. CASE ANALYSIS 
 
A detailed analysis of the drivers and enablers that have 
influenced the design of BMW’s and Volvo’s international 
production networks has revealed a number of themes 
that are common to both companies and other aspects 
that are unique to their particular situation. Factors that 
have determined a unique approach include markets, 




The drivers can be grouped according to a number of 
broad themes, i.e. environmental and safety standards 
(for passengers and pedestrians), flexibility and agility, 
leanness, ownership imperatives, legacies from mergers 
and acquisitions, technology security, currency exchange 
movements, and cross-border obstacles resulting from 
trade restrictions. Table 1 provides a summary of the 
main themes together with examples of associated key 
features at Volvo Car and BMW. It also highlights the 
principal factors that require consideration when designing 
or reconfiguring international production networks. Three 
key features have been identified under the environmental 
and safety standards theme. The first two of these relate 
to emissions control and efficiency of motor vehicle power 
units.  
 
Both Volvo Car and BMW have developed internal 
combustion engines powered with biofuels, although with 
subtle differences. Volvo’s main focus has been on the 
Swedish and European E85 (85% ethanol) standard, 
whereas BMW has focused mainly on the Latin American 
Flexfuel E100 standard that is prevalent in Brazil with its 
warmer climate. In this situation ethanol, made from local 
sugar cane, is a more feasible engine fuel when either 
used in its pure (100%) form or mixed with any amount of 
petroleum. With this aspect, markets and R&D centres 
are the principal factors to be considered. Under the same 
environmental theme both companies have also been 
developing alternative forms of propulsion, although to 
date Volvo been following mainly the hybrid engine route 
(with 20% of its X90 crossover model being hybrids),
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Table 1: Drivers and network design factors 






Network design  
factors 
Environment / safety E85 biofuel engines for 
Sweden and European 
markets 
Flexfuel E100 engines for Latin 
American markets (Brazil) 
Markets; R&D centres  
 
 Hybrid vehicles  Electric vehicles  Markets; Supply chain  
 Passive crash protection 
and collision avoidance 
Focus on active safety features Markets; Technology 
partners 
Flexibility / agility Scalable Product 
Architecture (SPA) 
Mixed model assembly plants Supply chain 
Leanness Limited options offered Build to Order Markets;  
Suppliers (supplier parks) 
Ownership  Various changes in 
ownership  
No ownership change 
(acquisitions only) 
Owner influence 
Legacies from mergers 
and acquisitions 
Legacy of Volvo Group  
and Ford  
Legacies from Rover  Plants; Suppliers 
Technology security Transfer risks through 
ownership and possible 
competing brands 
Transfer risk through 
partnership requiring control of 
IPR 
Nature of partnerships; 
Workforce mobility 
Currency exchange Expanding outside Europe 
but exposure to CNY risk 
Multiple locations to minimise 
exchange rate risk  
Dispersed networks 
Cross border obstacles Mainly limited to EU trade 
agreements 
Production in EU, NAFTA,  
Mercosur and ASEAN 
Tariff restrictions; non-
tariff barriers  
 
whereas BMW has placed more attention on the 
development of electric vehicles (with the BMW i3 
becoming the best-selling electric car in Europe during 
2016).  With this aspect, the principal network design 
factors are markets and supply chains for engines and 
transmissions. Also within this theme there are some 
differences in the way the two automotive companies have 
addressed the question of passenger and pedestrian 
safety. Volvo Car has traditionally focused on passive 
crash protection and more recently on collision avoidance 
in accordance with its well-known market strategy of 
making safety a priority. BMW on the other hand has a 
market strategy based on driving performance, which is 
reflected in its focus on building active safety features into 
its cars. With this aspect, markets and technology 
partners are the principal network design factors.   
Compared with more traditional factory level priorities the 
flexibility and agility theme within the international 
production networks of both companies focuses mainly on 
design rather than volume flexibility. Volvo Car has 
recently developed a concept known as Scalable Product 
Architecture (SPA) to enable greater model range and 
variety based on common modules. BMW on the other 
hand has placed its focus on mixed model production 
systems at its international plants to enable a wide range 
of offerings in local markets. This aspect places greatest 
emphasis on the supply chain and its capability as the 
principal network design factor. Since the early 1990s lean 
production concepts have become well embedded in most 
automotive companies. However, at Volvo Car and BMW 
there are some differences in implementation that impact 
on international network design. These partly result from 
the relative market size and sales strategy of each 
company. Volvo Car offers a comparatively limited range 
of options for its models and provides a large number of 
features as standard, thereby enabling leanness in a 
system for building to stock.  BMW on the other hand has 
developed a build-to-order system, which to enable lean 
production means having greater coordination within the 
supply chain. For both companies this aspect places 
markets, suppliers (and supplier parks) at the centre of 
their network design thinking. The theme of ownership, 
together with legacies from mergers and acquisitions, has 
a profound impact on international production networks. 
In some respects, this aspect is outside the control of 
network designers, although in other cases an acquiring 
firm may be influenced by the existing network of an 
acquisition target. The situation of Volvo Car has mainly 
been as an acquired company, with its past acquisition of 
DAF being made by the Volvo Group and having only 
short-term impact on its car division. Nevertheless, its 
acquirers (Ford, and more recently Geely) have still 
imposed considerable influence on how its networks have 
evolved. By contrast, BMW has made a small number of 
important acquisitions that have influenced both its model 
range and also the network of production facilities used to 
support all its manufacturing activities (at its own plants 
and also its suppliers).  
 
The last three themes in Table 1 are all consequent on 
cross border considerations and the impact they have on 
international production networks. Technology security is 
of particular concern for retaining competitive advantage 
and both companies are exposed to risk through their 
international ownership structure and partnerships. 
Workforce mobility into and out of the international 
network is also an important design factor within this 
aspect, so requires careful management control. Currency 
exchange represents another theme with both 
opportunities and risks. Due to its larger size, BMW has 
been able to manage this aspect more effectively by 
operating in multiple locations, with its plants in the USA 
and Latin America being operated partly as a measure to 
hedge against currency variations as well as providing 
greater cost security when selling to local markets. 
Outside Sweden, Volvo Car by contrast has traditionally 
focused production and sales within Europe and more 
recently the “Eurozone” common European currency area, 
although the more recent expansion of its network into 
China has created some currency risk regarding the 
Chinese Renminbi Yuan (CNY). Only in 2015 did it start 
construction of a new manufacturing plant in North 
America after closing the Canadian facility almost 20 
years previously. The final theme in Table 1 relates mainly 
to financial tariffs and other cross border non-tariff 
barriers such as country product standards and cabotage 
restrictions. The move towards free trade agreements and 
single markets has provided some mitigation with Volvo 
Car traditionally benefiting mainly from the EU single 
market and to a lesser extent the South East Asian 
(ASEAN) free trade agreement, while BMW has also more 
recently taken advantage of the free trade agreements in 
North America (NAFTA) and Latin America (Mercosur) as 




To enable smooth operations of their international 
production networks, both companies make extensive use 
of ICT solutions for information sharing and control. BMW 
has developed a “Partner Portal” as its interface and 
communication platform for the whole BMW group and its 
various partners. It also has a “Business Network Portal” 
for employees and partners to access the company’s 
business services and electronic mail systems. The 
equivalent Volvo Cars “Supplier Portal” provides 
information and communications for suppliers regarding 
purchasing conditions, payment procedures, quality and 
sustainability. Supply of parts to the international 
production network is also simplified by reducing the 
number of first tier suppliers and making extensive use of 
product modules. Both BMW and Volvo Car have internal 
component manufacturing facilities or dedicated third 
party delivery of complete sub-assemblies from supplier 
parks (such as cockpit and dashboard modules, seating 
units, automatic transmissions etc.).  Their role is 
important to network design and control. Of similar 
importance is the role of specialised shippers and 
providers of third party logistics solutions for materials. 
For its plant in Brazil the port of Paranaguá is uniquely 
equipped for handing specialised RoRo vehicle carriers 
with movable decks, while similarly the port of Gent has 
been upgraded and equipped for shipping the Belgian 
production of Volvo Cars. Efficient technology transfer 
from the parent company to subsidiaries and partners has 
become a vital aspect of international production networks 
and, as mentioned earlier, technology security has 
become an important consideration for this enabler. In the 
same way, international skills mobility is an enabler but 
carries risk of knowledge misappropriation as personnel 
move within networks, and especially when interacting 
outside the network.        
 
8. DISCUSSION  
 
The purpose of this empirical study has been to explore 
recent developments in international production networks 
with a view to identifying and assessing the main drivers 
and enablers in two medium size automotive companies 
that both target the same customer segment, i.e. the 
premium market. It finds that network design has moved 
beyond the traditional “keiretsu” supply arrangements of 
Japanese automotive companies, which were typically 
associated with the lean production concept represent in 
an earlier, narrower model of manufacturing networks. 
These early types of plant arrangements proved incapable 
of achieving the need for speed of change, flexibility and 
cost cutting that was demanded from the late 1990s and 
were also more suited to plant networks that were largely 
distributed domestically rather than internationally [10], 
[11].  
 
9. CONCLUSION  
 
The current study has found that the principal imperatives 
of cost reduction and quality improvement are now 
achieved mainly through actions within the company’s 
own network elements rather than externally through 
pressure on the supplier network. Among the drivers that 
have been identified for networks today are several that 
are less closely related to the priorities of quality, cost, 
lead time, delivery reliability, and volume flexibility, which 
are now regarded as norms, so therefore taken as read, 
and thus implicitly built-in as essential attributes of the 
core network structure, while newer priorities drive the 
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